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CRITICAL COMMENTARY 
 
Some Notes on the Language Game of Dark Leisure 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As T.S. Eliot pithily told us in his famous poem, The Naming of Cats, naming is a difficult 
matter, absolutely not a holiday game. In leisure studies, as in sociology and the other social 
sciences, naming is a language game of primary importance. It not only conjures a term (or a 
combination of terms) by which an activity, category of experience, group of people, 
phenomenon, trend, or any other subject or object of thought associated with leisure (past and 
present) is known, but it also signifies a method of description, of conceptualisation, of 
classification, and, obviously, of labelling.  
 
In this critical commentary, I am interested in the naming of the phenomenon of ‘dark 
leisure’, not just as an academic subject matter in leisure studies, but as a particular impulse 
of twenty first century freedom. As this special issue attests, of all recent developments in 
leisure studies, perhaps no event has registered a mor  widespread impact than the growth of 
interest in this phenomenon. There are articles and book chapters aplenty about its many 
manifestations but none of these attempt to spell out in any precise detail what it amounts to. 
This article should be read as an attempt to spell out what this something might be. As far as I 
know, it is the first attempt to do so. I have searched the literature for something of its kind 
and found nothing, except a number of general representations that have emerged from 
research on dark leisure which suggest that this phenomenon constitutes a body of theory and 
concepts that rest on four core assumptions (see for example Spracklen and Spracklen (2012) 
and Stone and Sharpley (2014)). First, it arises in connection with leisure that is perceived as 
‘deviant’ or ‘abnormal’. Second, it tends takes place in ‘new communicative (dark) spaces’ 
and/or liminal settings of social ambiguity which reach out towards alternative communitas-
type realities. Third, it is appealing to those individuals and groups fascinated with death 
and/or are bound together through their interest in dark (often gothic) popular culture, 
whether focused on fashion, decoration, travel, film, music etc. And fourth, certain moral 
Page 1 of 17
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ranz  Email: neil.carr@otago.ac.nz
Annals of Leisure Research
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
implications often arise as a result of dark leisure activities. Given these varied 
understandings, it is important to explore the theories and concepts used in more detail. 
 
I am not talking about offering anything so bold as a definitive interpretation, but something 
more modest: a guide to what it is about dark leisure that makes it attractive to certain 
academics and ordinary people alike. I shall argue that a number of themes can be identified 
as recurring elements surrounding the phenomenon of dark leisure. The similarities that the 
reader will find here are in the pattern of what Wittgenstein gave the name family 
resemblance: what makes the members of a family look alike is not that there are some 
characteristics which appear in all of them, but rather that each member resembles some of 
the others in one way or another, and that not one of them looks wholly different from the 
rest. When I say in the following discussion that dark leisure is ‘abnormal leisure’ (Rojek 
2000), ‘heterotopic’ (Foucault 1984), and so on, I do not point at some common essence that 
all of them share, but at their family resemblance.  
 
To keep up the family metaphor, what I am proposing is that dark leisure must be interpreted 
pragmatically rather than definitively. With respect to this idea, reference must also be made 
to Wittgenstein’s other key idea of language games. Wittgenstein knew that metaphors are 
important for clarifying understanding, not only because they use language in magical and 
enlivening ways, but also because they are edifying and enlightening. To this end the idea of 
language games is concerned with the way in which words can only be properly understood 
in the context of their use. This last observation notwithstanding it is nonetheless challenging 
to address critically a ‘family’ whose members are so different in kind, and so numerous, that 
it would be difficult to get to know them all personally in such a short commentary as this 
one. To approach this task, then, I will only offer a brief critical discussion of some of the 
members of the immediate family. Before I do this, however, we need to discuss some 
fundamental issues that arise when trying to think critically about the word ‘darkness’. 
 
Darkness 
 
It would be impossible, in the space of a short essay, to do anything like justice to this word. 
But it is worth drawing up a brief inventory of the family characteristics that make it 
distinctive. ‘Darkness’ is known to all cultures; and there has been and survives a 
semantically equivalent word in every culture, referring to an absence of ‘light’.  But for time 
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immemorial this juxtaposition has hardly ever been a neutral one. As St John says in the New 
Testament (Chapter 3, verse 19):  ‘Men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds 
were evil’. Here ‘darkness’ is the absence of ‘light’ in the same way that ‘evil’ is the absence 
of ‘good’. These seductively reassuring propositions of dualism suggest that the structure of 
reality is binary and our knowledge of the world is essentially always a double. As Derrida 
(1992), the great French philosopher, famously pointed out, within this system of thought one 
part of that binary is always more important than the other, that one term is ‘marked’ as 
positive and the other negative. Derrida argues that all binary pairs work this way; one term is 
always valued over the other, given special presence, which is always favoured over absence. 
What this tells us is that word ‘darkness’ says that the condition of the thing to which it 
applies is not what it ought to be, or what it is normally expected to be. It is sinister or evil, 
gloomy or dismal, ignorant or unenlightened, and as such denotative of some kind of 
deformity, malfunction or aberration. In other words, in most if not all cultures, ‘darkness’ 
means abnormality of the normal state of human affairs. To this extent ‘abnormality’ 
signifies those kinds of leisure activities and interests which are condemned by the ‘value 
consensus’ as ‘wrong’, while implying that they also need to be censured or socially 
controlled. 
 
Abnormal leisure 
 
Among the first degree relatives of the dark leisure family, it would make sense then to 
identify first abnormal leisure (Rojek 2000). This idea might be understood as the 
designation for all that is strange and deviant, unbridled and tempestuous, and which in many 
cases are likely to be infractions of the criminal law. It also constitutes the outlandish leisure 
pursuits that we are illicitly attracted to, but also fear and dare not try to fathom, but are often 
nonetheless fascinated enough to try out. To this extent, abnormal leisure is the example par 
excellence of the unresolved, disturbing forms of our desires and fantasies, which are 
explored to good effect by Ken Kalfus (2006) in his post-9/11 novel A Disorder Peculiar to 
the Country. This novel, which is a not so simple story of adultery, demonstrates how the 
psychology of domestic attrition stands for the paroxysm, the whole dying world of USA 
security, as New Yorkers indulge in ‘terror sex’ in order to gain social advantage, and where 
the highest thrill is to bed somebody who has survived the twin towers or served emergency 
duty in its aftermath. Here, focusing on the pleasure that people derive from what makes 
other people suffer, Kalfus gives us a Freudian explanation. What forms in this process is the 
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death drive: people die as a result of an extreme act of terrorism, and others derive a sexual 
pleasure out of it. 
 
Borrowing a concept or two from Freud and contextualizing his core argument around the 
concepts of liminality, edgework and surplus energy, Rojek (2000) outlines three key types of 
abnormal leisure: wild, invasive, mephitic leisure. Rojek’s first category involves limit-
experiences through edgework and as such tends to be opportunistic in character. It involves 
the individual’s self-absorbed desire for instant gratification. The experience of ‘limit’ is the 
name of the game with wild leisure which includes deviant crowd behaviour such as rioting, 
looting and violence, particularly at sports events. Rojek also suggests that new technology 
presents individuals intent on pursuing wild leisure with ever more opportunities for instant 
gratification, typically in the form of video clips of anything from violence in sport  to 
genocide, which present individuals with the vicarious ‘delight of being deviant’ (Katz 1988). 
To borrow an insight from Susan Sontag (1965, 215), such abnormal leisure activities often 
offer the satisfaction ‘of extreme moral simplification – that is to say, a morally acceptable 
fantasy where one can give outlet to cruel, or at least amoral feelings.’  
 
Invasive leisure focuses on abnormal behaviour associated with self-loathing and self-pity 
and the ways in which disaffected individuals experience anomie and personal alienation 
from the rest of society, losing themselves in drink, drug or solvent abuse in order that they 
can ‘turn their back on reality’.  
 
As with wild leisure, mephitic leisure encompasses a wide range of pursuits and activities, 
from mundane encounters with prostitutes to the buzz of murdering through serial killing. 
Why Rojek calls these leisure pursuits mephitic is that they are generally understood to be 
‘noxious’, ‘nasty’, ‘foul’ and ‘morally abhorrent’ by most ‘normal’ people, because they 
cause major offence to the moral order of things. To this extent mephitic leisure experiences 
involve the individual’s self-absorbed desire for gratification at the expense of the self and 
others. What Rojek is alluding to here is that the death drive is just as important to 
understanding leisure as the pleasure principle (Freud 1995a). In other words, we often act in 
complete disregard of our self-interest and the interest of others in order to act out 
compulsions that we do not understand. Moreover, there are occasions when we will sacrifice 
anything and everything (even life itself) for our particular enjoyment.  
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At the core of Rojek’s thesis is a rather unsettling message about the persistence of violence 
in leisure. A good example here might be blood sports which sees some people hunting 
animals because they enjoy killing them. What this suggests is that, for some people, the ‘hot’ 
blood of the hunt is some kind of compensation for the ‘cold’ bloodiness of modern life. 
What this tells us is that we might look back at what previous generations did with horror, but 
the glorification of violence and its enjoyment is still very much a part of modern leisure. 
Freud (1995b, 775) suggested as much in the first section of his famous essay Civilisation 
and Its Discontents, when he took Rome to be a useful metaphor for the processes of modern 
civilisation. Like Rome, Freud suggested, modernity might be evolving towards a newer and 
better society but it could not entirely shake off its past. Modernity carries with it, beneath its 
modern foundations, the ambivalence of its own historicity. As Freud put it, ‘nothing which 
has once been formed can perish – that everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable 
circumstances (when, for instance, regression goes back far enough) it can once more be 
brought to light’. What Freud’s analysis suggests is that at one level there is with the 
emergence of modernity progressive affirmation of civilisation; but at another it has ‘buried 
in the soil of the city or beneath its modern buildings’  the regressive means of decivilisation. 
 
Leisure values 
 
A second matter, then, I would identify in relation to dark leisure is the concern with values, 
especially moral and ethical values. There is an ‘ethical’ divide about the relative merits of 
abnormal leisure in leisure studies. Criticizing Rojek’s work, Aitchison has argued that 
‘violence, abuse and violations of human rights may well play a part in exploitative leisure 
relations but these acts themselves are not acts of leisure – they are acts of violence and 
should be named and researched as such’ (quoted in Rojek 2000, 167). However, throughout 
his publishing career, Rojek has refuted all the axioms of leisure as it is normally understood 
in leisure studies. This ‘ideal’ kind of leisure may be claimed as the norm in leisure studies, 
with alternatives drawn from the ‘dark side’ rejected as immoral and therefore, strictly 
speaking not leisure, because of their dereliction of leisure’s proper role which is to edify, 
bring individuals together in communities, and so on. However, what this ‘ideal’ ignores is 
the necessity to take seriously the totality as part of the story of modern leisure and not just 
the bits we happen to think are good and proper. 
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In Rojek’s view abnormal leisure may belong to the forbidden and the deadly, but is simply 
not true that we need be wholly opposed abnormal leisure experiences, even when we feel 
they are morally suspect. We need to engage with them if we are to understand their meaning 
for those involved. Hannah Arendt (1963) coined the expression ‘banality of evil’ in order to 
bring to our attention the shocking ordinariness of such activities. In the light of Arendt’s 
perceptive observation we should recognise that Rojek is merely tearing off leisure studies’ 
veil of respectability to reveal what lurks in the hearts and minds of a good many men and 
women, which enables him to say something important about the infinite playfulness of the 
human mind. The mirror image this holds up to us may not be an ideal picture - it can 
frequently be dreadful and upsetting, and often even morally repugnant – but it is leisure all 
the same. 
 
For all the strengths of Rojek’s analysis, however, he does not give sufficient consideration to 
two important issues. First, he fails to recognise the fact that in its contemporary usage 
abnormal leisure is often complicated by its tendency to come in commodity form. Second, 
and related to this first issue, while foregrounding the way the death drive takes precedence 
over the power of the pleasure principle, leading some individuals to seek suffering rather 
than pleasure, he never discusses the wider implications of this for understanding abnormal 
leisure. It is to these two issues that we must now turn.  
Leisure, deviance and consumptive deviance 
Drawing on the topic of sport and using the term deviant leisure, rather than abnormal 
leisure, Blackshaw and Crabbe (2004) argue that since the 1990s the demarcation between 
‘real’ deviance and that which has been produced for consumption has blurred as the 
abnormal has been turned into yet another marketable commodity. In other words, so called 
‘deviant’ behaviour in sport is, as they put it, ‘often just surface, flow and performance 
without the exit wounds’. This is abnormal leisure staged for consumption and the sense of 
the spectacular that is often involved, but also the mass and the calibre of the audience for it, 
since it is through marketized images, ‘confessionals’ and rumours of celebrity ‘deviance’ in 
sport that our desires for the ‘deviant’ Other tend more and more to be fulfilled. In a culture 
in which consumption is paramount, consuming ‘deviant’ sport becomes yet another lifestyle 
choice. The consumption of ‘deviance’, or what Blackshaw and Crabbe call ‘consumptive 
deviance’, seeks to capture a sense of the phantasmagoric nature of existence which eludes 
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people in the mundane quotidian of their everyday lives. These phantasmagoria, they suggest, 
have become part of the high altar of consumer capitalism.  
In other words, consumer capitalism now ‘needs’ irrationality and impulsive behaviour, and 
as such, the concept of abnormal leisure simply reflects the dynamics of our contemporary 
lived condition – it is, paradoxically, the norm. Drawing on the work of Bauman (2000), they 
argue that today the societal conventions associated with Freud’s (1995a) concept of the 
reality principle which involved forsaking the irrational and postponing pleasure through the 
constant suppression of the desire for the transgressive and the ‘deviant’, might be considered 
to have been replaced by a ‘precarized’ hybrid existence which is both more intense but at the 
same time much less sure, lacking a distinctive singular feel. Since whilst the label of 
abnormal was easily applied in the producer based capitalism – with its requirement for self-
discipline through the values of Protestant work ethic –in our era of ‘liquid’ modern 
consumer capitalism the ideal consumer is not a coherent and self-disciplined individual with 
a fixed identity, but somebody who can identify with an endless supply of commodity goods. 
Somebody who is also always open to new desires and new fantasies including the seductive 
allure of abnormal leisure which nourishes the desiring and fantasizing impulses which are 
both acknowledged and necessary to sustain the mediated capitalist consumer-based 
economy. Consumerism prospers because it is best placed to furnish human life with the 
necessary distractions to divert our attention from the oppressive awareness of our mortality. 
In so doing it homogenizes the abnormal by melting together consumption and deviance. 
This does not mean that all the categories of consumptive deviance are at bottom all the 
same. On the contrary. They could not serve their adherents as guides to living if they did not 
embody within them the distinctive qualities which differentiate them from other kinds of 
leisure. The point is that now that deviant behaviour has no need for indirection, now that its 
sense of aberrancy has been eased because the pleasure principle no longer remains in the 
shadow of the reality principle (Blackshaw and Crabbe 2004, 85) and its place in society 
adumbrated if not secured, it has become ripe for consumption. 
 
What this suggests is that today dark leisure might also be considered as something that 
provides consumers with a passport, which allows them to relatively safely transgress the 
boundaries of the permissible, allowing unmitigated access to what is conventionally 
repressed or forbidden. Rojek (2000, 191) argues that this kind of leisure turns us into shock-
connoisseurs, seeking the next thrill, as we ‘play at being deviant and engage in what Katz 
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(1988) describes as ‘the delight of being deviant’’. It is the vicarious sense of having done 
something bad that feels rather cool that matters. In other words, the dangerous enjoyment 
people get from dark leisure doesn’t just capture the euphoria of ‘deviancy’, it also provides 
the romance of it. Sloterdijk (2012, 52) argues that nothing is more normal today than 
removing ourselves from any kind of normality. This kind of life practice is perhaps best 
encountered in ‘the shadow worlds of reverie’ Foucault called heterotopias. 
 
Heterotopic leisure 
In contrast to the homogenizing tendencies of consumptive deviance in which dark leisure 
emerges as a kind of entertainment, those who seek dark leisure in heterotopia are after 
heterogeneity and spiritual experience. There is an abstraction from time and space which 
corresponds to a Bergsonian time of subjective experience that replaces objective time 
experience. Here the existence is the mystery – the secret, the unknown known – not the 
meaning and purposes of leisure, that is of true significance.  
 
As I argue in Blackshaw (2017), too complex for rational interpretation, yet at the same time 
seemingly a tabula rasa for all individuals’ desires, heterotopias are ‘disturbing’, 
 
probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to 
name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 
‘syntax’ in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also 
that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one 
another) to ‘hold together’. This is why utopias permit fables and discourse: they run 
with the very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the 
fabula; heterotopias …desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very 
possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism 
of our sentences (Foucault, 1970, xix).  
In an article Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias, first published in 1967, Foucault 
(1984) identifies two main categories of heterotopia. There are the pre-modern heterotopias 
of crisis, otherwise known as ‘elsewhere’ places which tended to be relegated to the margins 
of modern societies. Foucault has in mind here privileged places such as single-sex boarding 
schools where young boys are taken through a sexual rite of passage that is neither 
homosexual nor heterosexual; sacred places such as pilgrimage sites; and forbidden places 
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such as brothels. In assessing the ways in which these ‘elsewhere’ places have been 
transformed in modern societies, Foucault offers his second category of heterotopia, which at 
their most basic are the places of deviance, such prisons and mental asylums, where those 
considered ‘abnormal’ by the standards of modern norms can be spatially isolated. 
In developing a more elaborate conception of this second category of heterotopia, Foucault’s 
analysis suggests that these ‘elsewhere’ places must be understood in relation to the kind of 
society in which they occur. Where conventional leisure worlds fit snuggly into reality; 
leisure heterotopias do not. In any society there are some people for whom the ‘real world’ 
does not resonate with their own experiences. Even though we are indoctrinated into thinking 
that ‘this way, rather that that’ is the right way to live, we tacitly know it is mistaken. In other 
words, the ‘real world’ robs some people of the kind of fullness of life others are able to find 
in normalcy. The ‘real world’ is for these individuals at once too much and not enough. What 
Foucault’s analysis suggests is that a sense of recompense for a life that is not being lived in 
the confines of the ‘real world’ leads people down the track of heterotopia: reality and 
rationality are not on their menus, since what they are after is an unmediated immediacy of 
something together out of the ordinary.  
To this extent heterotopias tend to come to life in pointillist time, which means they are 
experienced as episodic. They constitute sequestered spaces which have their very own 
systems of ‘opening and closing’ that both isolate them from the rest of society and operate to 
exclude those who do not have the necessary credentials to enter. In so doing heterotopias, 
function by way of opposition; that is they have a tendency to unfold ‘between two extreme 
poles’. However, heterotopia offers spaces of compensation (rather than the illusion of 
utopia) and as such functions in relation to the way that its (deviant) populations understand 
they are imagined by the rest of society. In heterotopia individuals do not try to resist reality 
so much as escape it – and in so doing creatively find their own place in it. 
Beneath the calm surface of everyday social reality flow strong and deadly currents. Against 
sad obscurity, against surrender to societal norms, against normalcy, heterotopia suggests 
desire for an alternative kind of knowledge, for another kind of determination, for ragtag 
unyielding life, the kind of worlds that provide expression and shelter for the ones who 
choose to escape meaning there. Heterotopias are a feast for anyone hungry for otherness. 
Their incumbents create spectacular spaces in which ‘reality’ itself seems to dissolve under 
the pressures of desire and we are left with individuals who shape-shift personalities as their 
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compulsions are let loose.  Whoever seeks out a heterotopia knows that once they arrive 
there, they will find a special kind of freedom. For these individuals the world most of us call 
the ‘real world’ is not the real world: the real world is an-other world. 
 
In heterotopia nothing is straightforward. Because hermeneutics is absent words have their 
own usages, and nothing is ever never quite settled. Make-believe is pervasive, often the 
custom. Leisure heterotopias belong to the ‘communities’ that create and use them. They 
represent alternative kinds of cognitive, social and moral space, emerging not from 
established imaginative traditions, but instead from the pursuit of mutual passion, pleasure 
and purpose, dignified and elevated by the ingenuity of their sense of invention and the 
centrality of this to the lives of those present. Drawing on the two very different examples of 
‘cruising’: car cruising and the gay men who cruise for group sex in Samuel Delany’s novel 
The Mad Man (1994), I demonstrate how leisure heterotopias provide access to radically 
different existential possibilities, and thereby expand what is meant or could mean to be 
human, by giving reality to what the ‘real world’ cannot quite grasp, to what it wishes wasn’t 
there, or to what it fears: death. 
 
Leisure heterotopias: death and belonging 
 
Religion once upon a time provided a guarantee against death. However, the importance of 
religion as an institution that structures social existence has waned dramatically in modern 
Western societies. In their discussion of dark leisure, Stone and Sharpley (2014) point to the 
singular importance of individualisation – understood as the interdependency between society 
shaping individuals and individuals forming their own society – to this process of 
secularisation, which brought with it a rational commitment to robust individualism and the 
right to freedom from religion and other traditions and institutions. In their view 
secularisation has left modern lives disoriented, not only cut adrift from the comforting 
controls of religion but also devoid of any secure moral foundations. The function of dark 
leisure is the reconfiguring of morality and the integration of individuals through the pursuit 
of their collective interest. As they explain in offering a summative model of dark leisure 
tourism experiences: 
 
First, secularisation and the negation of religion as a traditional dominant framework, in 
which meaning and moral guidance is provided, has seemingly left some individuals 
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isolated, disoriented and morally confused. Second, as post-conventional societies 
cultivate a process of individualisation and moral confusion, individuals seek morally 
relative meaning on their own terms and from non-religious and non-traditional 
institutions, enabling dark tourism places in the representation of taboo topics to 
become contemporary (dark) communicative spaces. Third, individuals collectively 
assemble in these new communicative (dark) spaces, resulting, potentially, in both the 
provision and extraction of moral meaning about a particular tragic event, which in turn 
allows the self to become embodied through a dark leisure experience. Finally, 
collective effervescence and its resultant emotional energy is discharged through and by 
embodied individuals within these new socially sanctioned dark spaces, whereby 
morality is conveyed not only by official interpretation of death or tragedy but also by 
the actual presence and emotional engagement of the individual visitor…This 
reconfiguration and revitalisation of moral issues through dark leisure is not deviant, 
nor should it generate discourse about deviance, but instead it should be viewed as a 
process of contemporary society in which we renegotiate moral boundaries and ethical 
principles through consuming the taboo. Therefore, it is, perhaps, the process of dark 
tourism which attracts individuals to consume death in new insulating spaces that 
generates a perceived deviance, in addition, or even rather than, the actual death, 
disaster or tragedy that dark tourism seeks to represent (2014, 62-3). 
 
Through this model Stone and Sharpley’s key concern is to analyse the prospects of securing 
social cohesion in the face of the rapid social changes brought about by individualisation. In 
resolving this ‘problem’, they conceive dark leisure in Durkheimian terms, which in their 
view not only reaffirms social integration through ‘collective effervescence’, but also 
provides a forum for helping to resolve moral issues through consuming what the ‘value 
consensus’ sees as taboo. Like Durkheim they also proffer that deviance is actually normal; it 
is an important aspect of public discourse, and as such an integral part of the functioning of a 
healthy society. 
 
By contrast, I would argue that analytic attention should be squarely focused on the ways in 
which individualisation has radically transformed our relationship with death. In my view it is 
the loss of belief in immortality that lies at the root of religion’s decline in western 
civilisation. It was the spectacular failure of religion to offer modern individuals an effective 
solution to the problem of death that led to its decline. And, as we lost our belief in religion’s 
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ability to provide us with immortality we began to obsess about death. As we have seen, 
Freud assumed that the death drive controls human behaviour beyond the pleasure principle; 
it overrides the power of the pleasure principle and leads us to seek suffering rather than 
pleasure. But in heterotopia the death drive also acts as an entrance to another kind of world: 
immortality, understood in secular terms. Heterotopia not only facilitates our desire to escape 
from the social controls imposed on us by the ‘real world’ but offers us our own ‘private 
roads to immortality’ (Bauman 1992). As I argue in Blackshaw (2017, 160-1), these tend to 
come in 
 
two approved and practised life-strategies: this of felo de se aesthetic design (read: 
performativity) and that of immortalis interpretation (read: devotion). The former is a 
strategy geared towards revelation and the latter is a strategy geared towards 
conservation and restoration, of adapting new art forms from older ones. Some 
devotional leisure life-worlds may play one up and play the other down; but all 
devotional leisure lifeworlds deploy these two strategies. The former is positioned as an 
individual attribute and tends to surface spectacularly, but it is not fundamentally 
personal since all those who practise their devotion together have the potential to share 
in its achievement. The latter is positioned as a collective destiny, but it also serves as a 
vehicle fit for personal fulfilment. 
 
Underlying such life-strategies is also a longing for some kind of spiritual home, where we 
(individuals de facto) can belong, where, on arrival, an aggregate of isolated individuals can 
become a community of sorts. The sense of ‘community’ heterotopia generates is defined by 
a radical alterity. As Deleuze and Guatarri (1987) would argue, the ‘community’ experienced 
here is ‘traversal’, very much a plural process of unification, moving beyond the constraints 
implied by the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible, between presence and 
absence. Transversal unity has an open-textured quality that emerges in democratic 
communication that enables shared ways of being-in-the-world that know no boundaries.  
 
What Lyotard (1988) calls the differend offers another compelling way of explaining this 
present/absent ‘community’. In a differend there lies something that is beyond mere 
description. The question then becomes how to do justice to the something that cannot help 
but be missing. Lyotard’s answer is that first of all you have to bear witness to it. Secondly, 
you appeal to the kinds of feelings that enable you to supplement this evidence, the kinds of 
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higher pleasure that take you to that extreme where the pleasure principle meets the death 
drive. As Lyotard points out, only feelings can bear witness to the differend, and in particular 
the feeling of the sublime. It is the sublime then that enables those involved to sense the 
presence of ‘community’ (the feeling of intense, trembling pleasure that is only found in 
communion with another human being ) and equally the sense the impossibility of 
‘community’ (‘fantasies of closeness, of intimacy, that are way in excess of human 
possibility’ (Phillips 2006, 31)). This is the double pulse of this ‘community’, between the 
present and the absent, between the ideal and the real, between life and death, between the 
world that opens up in the imagination and world of everyday social relations. What 
Durkheim once said of religion is true of heterotopian ‘community’: it is conceived of 
nothing more (and nothing less either) than strangely organized practices that pay due 
reverence to the actuality of ‘being together’, ‘and thereby ensuring that this ‘being together’ 
can go on without causing too much trouble’ (Raud, in Bauman and Raud 2015, 76).  
 
The central life strategy adopted here is one intent on rekindling the ultimate experience of 
‘community’ which just like death itself cannot help but be missing in the ‘real world’. But 
those who seek community in heterotopia live for the moment, for the successive ‘now’. As I 
demonstrate in my discussion of the gay men who cruise for group sex in Delany’s novel, the 
individuals involved strive to squeeze all reality into the present. The kinds of ‘community’ 
found in heterotopia are always affecting, but also always contingent, aleatory, ephemeral 
and indeterminate. In heterotopia, ‘community’ never goes further than its ‘as-ifness’. Here 
community envisages eternity, not as permanent fixity, but as ephemeral ecstasy. It is the 
experience of departure that is the key to understanding heterotopian ‘community’. The key 
point is that we do not really know the significance of what we experienced there – the 
intense pleasure, the intimate sense of camaraderie – was until we leave. It is the experience 
of departure that is the litmus test, as this tells us how big a part of ourselves we are leaving 
behind. Heterotopia is somewhere we are always leaving, and we spend much of our lives 
trying to regain its experience again. This is why the sense of belonging found in heterotopia 
is also best understood in terms of a certain kind of death. Heterotopia might not have any 
firm foundations on which to build something more enduring, but it is a different world, one 
that has room for someone ‘just like you’. Despite the fact that it is always temporary, it is 
always welcoming to people who look and sound ‘just like you’ – people from elsewhere. 
The ‘community’ created in heterotopia, if not fireproofing you from death itself, at least 
retards the flame of exclusion. In the ‘real’ world this is something that is never going to 
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happen. Nothing else can provide the supremely comforting sensation of existing in the midst 
of something temporary conjured to feel so absolute. 
 
Conclusions 
What the foregoing discussion has suggested is that naming is a form of ‘objectivation’ and 
that dark leisure is the contemporary name for what leisure scholars have over the years 
variously called ‘abnormal leisure’, ‘deviance’, ‘consumptive deviance’ and ‘heterotopic 
leisure’.  The similarities that we have found here are in the pattern of what Wittgenstein 
called family resemblance. There are, of course, potentially other relatives of this family yet 
untouched.  By focusing on the ‘objectivation’ side of things, I have said much less about the 
‘subjectivation’ side of things – the constitution of the thinking, speaking ‘I’ – other than 
elaborating on what has already been extended from Freudianism and applying some insights 
from poststructuralism, and especially Foucault. To return to T.S. Eliot’s poem, The Naming 
of Cats, once again, I shall conclude this critical commentary by saying that the one specific 
value on which all these various family members must converge is a name variously 
interpreted but one that never belongs to more than one cat.  
 
And that is the name that you never will guess;  
The name that no human research can discover– 
But THE CAT HIMSELF KNOWS, and will never confess. 
When you notice a cat in profound meditation, 
The reason, I tell you, is always the same: 
His mind is engaged in a rapt contemplation 
Of the thought, of the thought, of the thought of his name: 
His ineffable effable 
Effanineffable 
Deep and inscrutable singular Name. 
 
The simplest way of reading these lines is, of course, to take Eliot’s conclusion literally to 
mean that cats cannot speak for themselves. Or perhaps to presume that by finishing the poem 
in this way, he is implying that species-specific experience is all we humans have got and that 
we need more than our imaginations to get inside the Umwelten of cats, in order to 
understand how they think.  Yet even if that is true (and there is other evidence in the poem 
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that leads us to believe it), such a profound ending seems distinctly inadequate as a response 
to what has gone before. My own inclination is that what Eliot is getting at is, that by the time 
we have read these concluding lines, we should have learned that notwithstanding the 
complexity of the names we conjure to explain how living creatures experience their worlds, 
the one specific value on which all of these must converge is freedom. Specifically, the 
freedom we have to identify and express ourselves in our own inimitable ways.  
 
Eliot’s admonition is to educate us to think in new ways about the nature of freedom by 
questioning what it is possible for us as  scholars to finally ‘know’ about other subjects.  This 
alerts us to the dangers of bringing ‘objective’ interpretations to ‘subjective’ realities and 
offers a word of warning that there is so much more to be done in terms of the 
‘subjectivation’ side of things.  In the transgressive inner worlds of dark leisure other things 
matter. The imagination is allowed to flourish. Here you alight on constant activity: desire, 
fetishist sex, necrophilia, escapology – infinite kinds of eccentricity. What this tells us is that 
‘subjectivation’ gives meaning to what escapes ‘objectivation’. This is the measure of its 
freedom. These are not worlds that are being arranged into a visible pattern, it is the life 
process going on regardless.  Those who find freedom there are all of us: a multitude of 
individuals. We just happen to be leading our own (dark) leisure lives.  
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